There have been some questions as to why we took down the Spring Game photos from the other day.  We have been specifically contacted by the athletics department regarding these photos.  We are currently discussing with them what is and is not appropriate to go up online.  While these discussions continue, we have taken down all Spring Game photos as a show of good faith.  Even ones that show individual drills or plays post-snap.

Of course, we bleed as much blue as the next guy.  And, to an equal extent, gold.  We would never want to harm Cal football in any way, shape, or form.  While we want you guys to enjoy the photos as much as we do, if the athletics department requests that they stay down, then, of course, out of respect, they will stay down.  As previously mentioned, while discussions are ongoing, they stay down.

However, HydroTech’s analyses will continue with screen shots from prior televised games.  And we will have reports of practices that we have attended and any practices we might attend in the future.  Of course, these reports will *continue* to not contain ANY information about plays or formations.  Hopefully, this answers some of your questions. 

Continuing on with part two of a four part analysis examining how Tedford’s offense has changed since his first year. 

Part I: Tedford’s Evolution of the Offense: The Tedford/Cortez Years

In 2006, Tedford brought in spread genius Mike Dunbar.  If I recall correctly, I believe Tedford reported that he wanted a "hybrid" offense.  One that could run both "pro-style" formations and plays as well as spread plays.  And for those of us that didn’t have press passes or insider access to practices in 2006, I don’t think any of us quite knew what to expect come Cal’s first possession against Tennessee in Neyland Stadium.  Well, it didn’t take long to see all the new formations that Dunbar had brought and implented into the Cal offense. 

The following are pictures of the many formations and a few plays which Dunbar added to the Cal Football playbook.  Please bear with me, there’s a lot to show.  We shall merely focus on the new shotgun plays which were so frequently used in 2006 and 2007. 

Below is what would become Dunbar’s (and later Tedford’s too) favorite personnel and formation set.  Below, the offense is using an "11 personnel" set - meaning 3 WRs, 1 RB, and 1 TE.  Aside from the "base" personnel set (2 WRs, 1 TE, 2 backs), the 11 personnel set would be Cal’s most common personnel set not only in 2006 but also in 2007.  The 11 personnel set essentially subs out the fullback for a 3rd WR.  The frequent use of the 11 personnel set in 2006 and 2007 was to get WRs Desean "Tha1" Jackson, Lavelle "The Hawk" Hawkins, and Robert "Rojo" Jordan on the field at the same time.  The most common formation for the 11 personnel set is as seen below - from shotgun, with 2 WRs to the side of the TE.  A few variants on this formation would place 2 WRs to the opposite side of the TE, or move the RB into the "strong" or "weak" position (to the side of the TE, or to the opposite side of the TE, respectively).  In the formation below, the RB is in the "strong" position (to the side of the TE).  Desean Jackson is at split end (the WR spot on the opposite side of the TE and on the line of scrimmage).  Placing Jackson away from the other receivers and tight end forces the defense to either shift coverage towards the majority of receivers to tighten up coverage and leave Jackson with looser coverage, or to shift the defense towards Jackson to tighten coverage and leave the majority of receivers with looser coverage.

Below is another variant of the 11 personnel set where the WRs are in a "trips" formation - meaning they are all to one side of the offense.  Putting all the WRs to one side can flood a defensive zone and also cause matchup problems for the defense.  Sometimes the trips formation will be on the same side as the and sometimes to the other side.  In the picture below, the trips formation is to the side of the TE.  Because the rules require that 7 players be on the line of scrimmage (LOS), a WR must be on the LOS.  Because the WR is on the LOS, he covers up the TE and the TE is an ineligible receiver.  In the picture below, the 3 WRs, the RB, and the QB are eligible receivers.  Had the trips formation been to the opposite side of the TE, then everyone except the 5 OLmen would be eligible receivers. 

Another formation that Dunbar installed and became fairly frequent in 2006 (and subsequently in the Tedford Year of 2007) was the bunch formation (see picture below).  The bunch formation places three receivers (not necessarily all WRs) in a small tight formation - usually a triangle shaped formation pointing towards the defense.  In the picture below, the "bunch" is to the left of the offense.  I believe the bunch contains TE Stevens at the point of the bunch, and WRs Hawkins and Jordan forming the other two points in the back.  Sometimes the coaches would vary the personnel in the bunch by using all WRs, or using a fullback instead of a WR. 

Putting the receivers in a bunch can make it very hard for the defense to cover the receivers in the back of the bunch because the receivers more towards the defense (the ones on the LOS) usually clear out the defense.  Also, putting the receivers in a bunch can cause coverage problems for the defense if they are in man-to-man coverage as since the receivers can easily "pick" the defenders (note: "picking" in the basketball sense is illegal in football although the term is used to loosely describe a WR purposely getting in the way of a defender in an attempt to free a fellow receiver).  Additionally, in the picture below the coaches are playing WR Desean Jackson at split end (WR on the LOS) away from the bunch to make the defense to choose between shifting towards the bunch or shifting coverage towards Jackson.  Essentially the defense must choose whether to shift coverage away from one of the best WRs in the country or shift coverage away from the majority of receivers on the other side of the field.

On rare occasions, Dunbar would use 4 WR sets or split 4 receivers out wide (not necessarily all WRs).  In the example below, the offense has four receivers split out wide but they are not all WRs.  I believe the middle receiver in the trips is TE Stevens.  Very rarely would Dunbar ever use 4 WRs in 4 WR sets.  Instead, he would often use a 4 WR formation but split a TE or FB out as a WR instead.  Doing this can bring extra blocking power to the outside, put a more powerful tackle-shedder against smaller DBs, and just confuse the defense since defensive alignment is often dictated and predicated on the location of the TE at the end of the offensive line (and not split out wide like a WR).

I suppose the ultimate "spread" play is one that really spreads out the defense.  Well, there’s little else that can do that if not nothing at all than a 5 WR set.  Below is an example of a 5 WR set.  The 5th WR is barely visible at the bottom of the screen and is somewhat hidden behind the ESPN game ticker.  I put a blue dot to the right of the Cal WR.  I am unable to tell if all 5 receivers are actually WRs or a mix of players (such as WRs, TE(s), and/or FB).  Nevertheless, it’s still a 5 WR formation often called by many teams as an "empty" formation or set because the backfield is empty (other than the QB).  Actually, I think it’s doubtful that all 5 receivers are WRs.  I don’t think I’ve ever seen Dunbar or Tedford ever put 5 WRs out on the field.  The max I’ve seen is 4 WRs and that itself is very rare.  I think during the Dunbar Year (2006) and the Tedford Year (2007), only maybe 5-7 plays actually had 4 WRs on the field at once - it’s a very rare occurrence.  Actually, I think that the receivers in the picture below are 11 personnel (3 WRs, 1 TE, and 1 RB). 

Finally, one of the more cutting-edge wrinkles that Dunbar brought to Cal was the use of the "wildcat" formation.  The wildcat formation was a name coined from Arkansas’ use of runningback Darren McFadden at the QB position (video link with explanation and analysis).  Just like Arkansas, Dunar would put the RB in shotgun and send the QB out wide (in the picture below, Marshawn Lynch is in shotgun and Longshore is at the top of the picture).  Doing this puts the defense into the box to defend the run - or shall I saw defend against Marshawn Lynch.  But as we’ve seen in the past, Marshawn Lynch can pass the ball plenty well so his ability to fake the run and pass, or roll out and pass is a possibility too.  As you can see in the picture below, Texas A&M has 8 defenders in the box and man coverage against the two WRs and Longshore.  In the maybe 4 times that Cal has ever used the Wildcat formation, we’ve always run the ball.  But maybe some day we’ll see a RB throw up a jump ball for the 6′5" Longshore if he’s covered by a shorter cornerback. 

Dunbar added a lot to the Cal offense.  What I covered is probably not even a third of the formations that Dunbar brought in (the other formations are slight variants of the ones above both in terms of formations and personnel within the formation).  Because this post was getting very large, I decided to split the Dunbar Year post into two parts.  So in a few days I’ll post part II which includes the famous "zone read" run play that Vince Young of Texas and Dennis Dixon of Oregon ran so well. 

I’m bad at intros.  I never know how to start things.  I always try to think of some nice smooth way to start a post without it being awkward but I never am successful.  So I’ll just jump right in and tell you what this post is about. 

This is the first of four posts that will chronicle how Tedford’s offense has changed since he’s been here.  

Many of you have probably been following Cal Football long before I.  I came to Cal in 2002.  Lucky me.  I came in with Tedford.  I’ll be honest.  Back then I didn’t follow the Cal Football team to the extent that I do now.  In 2002 I merely watched.  In 2003 I watched with an deep interest.  In 2004 I watched with a purpose.  It was in 2004 that I really started to take note of the Cal offense.  Maybe it was because I had watched Tedford’s offense for 3 years.  Maybe it’s because that’s when I realized I wanted to document what one of the greatest offensive minds in college football was doing and how he was changing things from year to year.  So from that point on I’ve been sort of following the Cal Football offense.  I guess it’s my hobby.  When I’m in class and the professor is blabbering about something called caveat emptor, I’m thinking about Tedford’s personnel and formational tendencies.  Xs and Os run through my mind.  I draw up how Cal’s run blocking might take on a 3-4 defense, or a 4-3 Under, or a 5-2.  I ponder why Tedford doesn’t do a certain type of run from shotgun any more.  Or why Tedford likes to run a strong-I now instead of a regular I-formation.  My friends at school make fun of me.  They can tell when I’m thinking about football.  I stare into space looking at the walls the ceilings pondering things.  My female friend will whisper to me, "HydroTech, are you footballing?"  I won’t respond.  Often my friends will have to snap their fingers in front of me to get my attention.  "Uh yeah, I was footballing.  Is it that obvious?"  They’ll nod. 

So I hope to show in this post and the following three how our offense has changed.  I hope to show what additions I’ve seen to the offense over the years.  Most of what I will show are just new formations which have popped up over the years but there will be a few new blocking schemes which I’ve noticed too.  What I show certainly isn’t all-inclusive.  Afterall, I am lacking a lot from the 2002 and 2003 seasons.  But I’ve definitely noticed a lot of changes, as I’m sure many of you readers have too.  Cal has been through quite an offensive evolution in the past few years.  We went from the Tedford/Cortez years, to the Dunbar year, to the Tedford year, and now to the Cignetti year(s). 

This first post is about the Tedford/Cortez years - that’s 2002-2005.

[EDIT: The following photos are from screen captures of TV broadcasts.] 

So I guess the first thing I need to do in order to show how the offense has changed is to show how it started out.  It started out with a very traditional pro style offense.  Lots of the same stuff you’d see on TV when watching NFL games.  Lots of 2 back formations, lots of 2 TE formations, lots of 2 back and 2 TE formations. 

Below is an example of the Strong-I formation.  This formation features 2 WRs, 1 RB, 1 FB and 1 TE.  The FB lines up behind the guard on the side of the TE.  This formation has been used a lot more frequently lately but I believe we did use it back in the Cortez days.  This is a popular formation to run out of since it features strength on one side of the offense.  The strength of the offense is formed by putting the TE and the FB to the same side.  In the picture below the strength is to the offense’s right.

[photo redacted]

Below is a photo of an Ace formation.  This formation uses 2 WRs, 2 TEs, and 1 RB.  Tedford has always used personnel sets with 2 TEs in it.  Sometimes the TEs will both be to the same side of the offense.  Other times they won’t.  Some times the TEs will both be on the line of scrimmage (LOS) and sometimes one won’t.  In the picture below the second TE is off the LOS.  This formation gives the offense balance when it places a TE on the LOS on both sides of the offensive line (OL).  The offense can run in either direction.  In the picture below, the second TE is off the LOS probably for motion or blocking purposes.  Because the offense has traded a second TE for the fullback, the offense does not have a lead blocker on running plays (unless they pull a guard or something). 

[photo redacted]
 

In the picture below, we again see the Ace formation.  But this time both TEs are on the LOS.  This brings about that balance I was talking about.  The offense is equally distributed to both sides of center and are just as much of a threat to run right or left.  

[photo redacted]

In the picture below, the offense is in a Weak-I formation.  This formation is "weak" because it places the fullback behind the guard on the opposite side of the TE.  In this case, the TE is to the QB’s left and the fullback is to the QB’s right behind the right guard.  Additionally, the offense has put both WRs to one side as "twins."  In this photo they are to the same side of the TE.  

[photo redacted]

In the picture below, the offense is in a Strong-I formation but unlike the previous Strong-I photo (the first photo) this time the offense has twin WRs to the opposite side of the TE instead of 1 WR on each side of the offense.  So the TE and fullback are to the QB’s right, and both WRs are to the QB’s left.  

[photo redacted]
 

Below is a photo from this year’s spring game of a 3 WR set.  The QB is in shotgun, which is something Tedford and Cortez rarely did pre-Dunbar.  So just imagine the QB under center and the RB 7 yards behind the QB. 

[photo redacted]

Here is an actual screen capture from 2003 of a 3 WR set from under center (shown below).  Note there are two WRs to the QB’s right and 1 TE and 1 WR to the QB’s left.  This is more or less just an Ace formation with the offense subbing that 2nd TE for a 3rd WR.  The offense is probably hoping to get that slot WR (the one standing directly on the hash marks) to be covered by a slower safety or linebacker. 

On occasion, Tedford and Cortez liked to move around the runningback in the backfield too.  Below is a picture of a 3 WR set with the RB not directly behind the QB.  In this picture, the RB is in a "strong" position because he’s to the side of the strength (the side with the TE).

And Tedford and Cortez even occasionally went with 4 WR sets from under center.  Of course, the big threat here is that you have 4 really fast guys on the field all of whom are catch specialists.  This is mostly a passing formation since you have so few blockers but Tedford and Cortez would get tricky and sometimes run out of this personnel set and formation.  In the picture below, notice how there are 2 WRs on each side of the OL.  I cannot remember, but it’s possible that Tedford and Cortez put 3 WRs to one side and only 1 WR to the other - that’s just another way to vary the formation but keeping the same personnel set. 

Finally, Tedford and Cortez also used very strong running formations with 2 backs and 2 TEs.  In the picture below, there are TEs on both sides of the OL along with 1 FB and 1 RB in the backfield.  Obviously, this is a pretty threatening run formation with all those blockers instead of WRs.  

Anyways, that’s how things started off under Tedford/Cortez - as a pro-style offense.  All those TV color commentators always used the words "pro-style" when describing Tedford’s offense, and well, it’s a pretty honest description.  There’s nothing too radical or "gimmicky" here (although, nothing in football is really "gimmicky."  Often, the term "gimmick" is used to denigrate an unconventional offense that is very successful in its unconventional ways but as long as the offense is legal then ’sall good).  The Tedford/Cortez offense had no shotgun zone reads, no Air Force-like triple options, no wishbone formations, no bunch or stack formations.  I wouldn’t say the offense was vanilla since there was plenty of variety, but it certainly wasn’t Rocky Road. 

But then in 2006 things really changed.  That year Tedford brought in spread offense genius Mike Dunbar and the Cal offense definitively made a move from the pro-style to the spread end of the spectrum. 

Part II to be continued in a few days…