Good Play? Bad Play? (Cal vs. USC in 2007)
While we wait for CBKWit and Ragnarok to file their live game reports about Cal’s win last night, I thought we could take a look back at our football season. Our horiffic, horiffic football season.
Avinash over at Bears Necessity has been doing some play analysis from the Cal vs. USC game (2007). While his posts are interesting and enjoyable, I must respectfully disagree with some of his analysis and comments.
In his first analysis, Avinash writes: "Tedford didn’t have too many great moments of playcalling this year."
I disagree with this comment. Tedford had many great moments in playcalling last year. Many of those great moments went for 7 yard gains, 5 yard gains, 3 yard gains, 0 yard gains, loss of yardage, incompletions and interceptions. Great moments in playcalling aren’t measured by whether the play goes for touchdowns or 25+ yard big plays. Great moments in playcalling are when you call a play that you know will beat the defense. And you know it will beat the defense because you scouted out their tendencies. You know what personnel they’ll have in on 3rd and longs. Or you know that they have a tendency to blitz the weakside on 3rd or long. Or you bait the defense by using certain personnel as decoys.
I saw plenty of great play calls this last year. For example, during the Tennessee game Tedford methodically set up the defense with a progression of offensive plays. I saw him use certain players as decoys for trick plays (Best on a halfback pass).
And actually, the failed halfback pass against Oregon is a perfect example of my point: great playcalling occurs even on bad plays.
Just because the play didn’t work or wasn’t a touchdown, or at least a 25 yard gain doesn’t mean it was a bad playcall. Every play has an expected gain. For some it’s 15+ yards, others it’s 3 yards.
And let’s not forget that the players have to execute on the play too. Player performance can negate even the best playcalling. This last year we saw tons of false starts, WR drops, and errant throws kill drives, games, and great playcalling.
First, an example of Tedford’s great playcalling and usage of personnel as a decoy.
A perfect example of Tedford using certain players as a decoy was in the first quarter against USC in 2007 (look at 0:25 into this YouTube video to see the play). For most fans this is a simple end-around reverse. But there’s more to it than that. The beauty of this play is the formation, and the personnel used in the formation. In this play Tedford uses Jahvid Best as a decoy. Best is split out left with two WRs split out to the right along with the TE Stevens. The full back is in a "strong" position to the same side as the TE (right) but not directly behind the QB. The play starts out with Best running from the left to the right, and taking the ball off of a handoff giving the look of an end-around. The look of an end around is further supported by the formation - by having two WRs, the TE, and the FB all to the right of the formation to block for Best on the end-around. But the play is actually a reverse! Best tosses the ball to Hawkins on a reverse and Hawkins reverses to the left side of the field!
Tedford undoubtedly knew that Pete Carroll would be keying in on Best whenever Best took the field. And the pre-snap formation that Tedford showed just screamed "end-around" (because Best was split out wide, and all the other players were on the other side of the formation -to the side that Best was running to- to block for Best). So what does Tedford do? He messes with Carroll. He’s playing the mind game. He’s playing that chess game. That’s great playcalling right there even though the play only went for 15 yards or so.
Now, here’s a great example of a great playcall being negated by poor player performance.
A perfect example of player performance negating a beautiful playcall was in the 2007 Cal vs. USC game. The play I’m referring to is the very last Cal offensive play. Yeah, the one where Longshore throws an interception. While Longshore did make a bad throw, the playcalling of this play was beautiful. (For those of you with the game on Tivo or DVD, the play occurs in the 4th Quarter with 2:55 remaining. Otherwise, you can look at this poor quality YouTube video at 4:09 mark).
The formation used in this play is exactly the same one as the play above (the one where Tedford calls a reverse while using Best as a decoy). The formation is 2 WRs and a TE to the same side. The RB split out all alone on the other side of the field. And the FB in a "strong" position. The pre-snap look is exactly the same as the reverse. The motion is exactly the same too. The RB (Montgomery) comes towards the QB, but settles in the backfield behind Longshore in a typical strong-I formation.
This may not seem like much, but Tedford has already messed with Carroll in two ways. First, Tedford showed the end-around reverse formation but didn’t call a reverse and instead has Montgomery settle back into the strong-I formation pre-snap. Second, Tedford shows a second tendency, a tendency to run the ball after moving a flexed out RB back into the I-formation. Remember when Cal would always split Marshawn Lynch out wide as a WR, then motion him back into the formation behind the quarterback? What would the play be? A run. Tedford isn’t dumb. Neither is Carroll. If I know this tendency, along with all the fans, so does Carroll. So what does Tedford do? He builds off the tendency. He calls a home-run play. A pass play that attacks the deep safety and corner who have undoubtedly recognized a run formation, and a run tendency.
Unfortunately, on this play, Longshore throws an underthrown ball which is intercepted. Had the ball been thrown accurately, it probably would have been completed and had a very good chance at being a touchdown.
Anyways, the beauty of this play was the thinking behind the formation, and prior tendencies. The fact that the play failed is a reflection of player performance moreso than bad playcalling.
I shall reiterate my final point in case it become lost in all my playcalling talk. Great playcalling happens on small gains, no gains, losses, and interceptions. Just because the play isn’t a touchdown or flashy doesn’t mean there wasn’t deep thinking, and great playcalling going on.
Part II will be continued later.
But who’s job is it to gauge the strength and weaknesses of your players? You’ll see that in almost every game during the 1-6 drop, Longshore vastly struggled with throwing the deep route. Tedford should have known that and adjusted accordingly, relying more on the tight end or quick outs to keep the defense off balance.
Also, the fact that it was Montgomery in the game late in the 4th rather than Forsett indicated pass. Cal was loath to trust Monty with the ball late in the game (and yes I know Forsett had just scooted for 40 yards), and I don’t think I’ve ever seen him get a carry with Cal down late. So I think the play was quite as effective as you might think–and from watching that angle, I’m not even sure how Jordan catches that ball even if it’s thrown properly. The defense was playing well on coverage.
In any case, our definitions of playcalling seem to differ. No matter how ‘deep’ the thinking might be, the result of the play is what counts. Thinking that decisions are great regardless of the outcome is what gets people into trouble in the first place.
Comment by Avinash — March 20, 2008 @ 1:27 pm
Saying that only “the result of the play is what counts” is true if we’re just measuring the raw effectiveness of a play. But we’re not doing that. We’re trying to measure how good (or bad) Tedford’s playcalling was. That requires that we go beyond mere net yards gained or loss from the play. That requires us to look at plays that don’t have a great outcome. Anything else is merely short-changing Tedford.
And yes, the coach should call plays that maximize his player’s abilities. It did seem like Longshore had problems with the deep ball to untrained eyes. But careful review of game film shows WR running wrong routes, poor OL blocking leading to the QB being rushed, Longshore throwing the ball away, or Longshore purposely overthrowing the ball so only the WR can catch it.
And let’s not forget, that a lot of “bad” passes aren’t really bad passes. They are Longshore throwing the ball away. Fans may often wonder why Longshore threw the ball 5 yards out of bounds and scream that his accuracy sucks. Not always true. Longshore probably threw the ball out of bounds in order to prevent a sack (something he is very good at).
My point is that Longshore’s deep ball wasn’t as bad as everyone thinks. Everyone sees Longshore make an underthrown pass. But nobody sees the OL whiff a block and let a defensive lineman get into Longshore’s face.
If Longshore was so incompetent with the long ball, in addition to being inhibited by his mobility, you’d think Tedford would instead start Riley. But Tedford didn’t. Instead he started Longshore. Tedford repeatedly said, and has always said of Longshore, that Longshore can “make all the throws.”
Now, I will agree that our definitions of playcalling seem to differ. But I must contest, that if the real issue here is to determine whether Tedford called a good play or a bad play, then I cannot agree that your definition is proper or fair. Your definition would attribute fault to Tedford for an incompletion merely because the WR dropped an easily catchable ball. Your definition would attribute fault to Tedford for the runningback getting stuffed for a loss because the guard made one mental error and whiffed on one block. Your definition would attribute fault to Tedford for offensive pass interference. Can we truly say it’s fair to label an unsuccessful play that Tedford called as a bad playcall because “the result of the play is what counts”? I think not. As I have already illustrated, such a definition would attribute fault for things beyond Tedford’s control or intuitions. Thus, I must strongly and vehemently disagree with the definition you propose.
Comment by HydroTech — March 20, 2008 @ 2:11 pm
I question whether going for the homerun in that situation against the USC was the right call. There was plenty of time left on the clock and Cal could afford to be patient until its best player (Forsett) could catch his breath and get back on the field. While I agree that using variations off the same formation showed great savvy, I think they could have waited one or two plays before going for the end zone. Also consider the clock situation. Let’s say the play works perfectly and Cal scores a touchdown to tie it up. There would still be 2:30 left in the game, giving USC plenty of time to drive down for a winning field goal.
Comment by Greg — March 20, 2008 @ 3:53 pm
Greg, you bring up a good point that going for the homerun in that situation would leave a decent amount of time left on the clock for USC’s offense to score again (and actually, I believe Forsett was injured on the play immediately beforehand, and thus that was why Montgomery was in on the play, and thus also refuting the inference that Montgomery was in on the play because it was a pass). But as for going for the homerun ball 30-35 yards out (or however far out it the offense was), that makes sense knowing that it gets harder and harder to score a touchdown when the defense has less field to protect. Tedford might have realized this and wanted to go for the homerun before getting too deep into the redzone and being faced with USC’s daunting defense on a small field. Many coaches call plays “for the endzone” when they are on the 25-35 yardline areas because they’d prefer to stay away from those 1st and goal from the 10 yardline scenarios. And one must also consider that if Cal had scored, and left 2:30 on the clock for USC, they would have to drive the field -or at least half of it- in less than ideal passing conditions. So despite a quick score, Tedford might have taken into account that the weather was working in our favor.
Comment by HydroTech — March 20, 2008 @ 4:22 pm
After rethinking it, let me modify that statement of good playcalling. It is not solely the result that determines how good the playcall is, but how well the coach is analyzing the situation on the field.
The reason I alluded to the Forsett and Montgomery runs as good and bad respectively was because the former took advantage of a weak defensive situation, the latter repeated the same play on the same down in a similar situation against a stronger defensive formation.
The blanket statement about Tedford having a lot of bad playcalls might need to be modified a bit, but I do think Cal’s offense seemed to repeat itself a lot in October and November. But thanks for calling it out, I’ll address it in my next post.
Comment by Avinash — March 20, 2008 @ 10:35 pm
In response to: “The reason I alluded to the Forsett and Montgomery runs as good and bad respectively was because the former took advantage of a weak defensive situation, the latter repeated the same play on the same down in a similar situation against a stronger defensive formation.”
We both must be careful in our analyses to consider whether the offense took advantage of the defense or the defense took advantage of the offense. Remember, the offense calls the play first, before seeing the defense (unless the play is an option play or is audibled). So in essence, the offense can never take advantage of the defense unless the offense has scouted out defensive tendencies.
Your paragraph quoted above, regarding the analysis of the Forsett TD run, where you say it “took advantage of a weak defensive situation” is a fair and reasonable assumption. But I don’t think either of us can be sure that Tedford was truly taking advantage of a weak defensive situation or whether Tedford merely got lucky. It’s possible that Tedford scouted USC’s defense and knew they’d be in such a defense in such a situation, and thus called a perfect play to counter that defense, and thus a great playcall. But it’s also just as plausible that Tedford just got lucky. Meaning he called a play without regard to what the defensive formation and play might be, and got a touchdown off of it. Honestly, I personally cannot say that this playcall was either good or bad because I don’t know if Tedford foresaw the defensive formation & play, or whether Tedford just got lucky.
Comment by HydroTech — March 21, 2008 @ 1:56 am
Tha1 Plays Decoy (Robert Jordan TD versus TN)
This weekend I went about twelve rounds with Hydrotech from the California Golden Blogs over my playcalling posts (Part I & Part II of his ripostes are here). We both had errors in our logic (I think I said USC was in a 5-2 when it was clearly a 4-…
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