The Tennessee Debacle: Out-played or Out-coached? Part II
The Tennessee Debacle: Out-played or Out-coached? Part I
Continuing on with the Tennessee Debacle analysis, the following is part II and the beginning of the statistical analysis:
There were 34 total plays when Longshore was the QB. Of those 34 plays, 22 of the plays were passing plays and 12 of the plays were running plays (65% pass, 35% run). These results are fairly abnormal. In the past, Tedford’s offenses were a "run first" offense and ran the ball 5% to 10% more than they passed. Based on these results it seems as if Dunbar’s offensive ideology is already deviating from Tedford’s ideology. But what these results hide are instances where Cal might have been forced into passing situations, and did not have the option of running to maintain a more balanced run/pass ratio.
In fact, with Longshore as the QB, Cal’s offense was faced with 14 passing situations. Situations such as 3rd and 15, 3rd and 7, 2nd and 19, and 3rd and 18. If Cal was not forced into passing situations and these downs were 3rd and 3, or 2nd and 7, Cal would have the liberty to choose run or pass. Now just for kicks, let’s dream that these 14 passing situations were instead liberty situations where Cal could choose run or pass. Let’s just say that of those 14 plays Cal ran and passed 50% of the time. That’s 7 more running plays and 7 less passing plays. Cal then would have ran the ball 19 times and passed the ball 15 times (56% run, 44% pass) for a much more balanced run/pass ratio.
The next statistic I want to talk about is the percentage of shotgun snaps used versus the amount of under-center snaps. Remember the big question going into last season was "how much shotgun is Dunbar going to use?" And after watching the Tennessee game, it sure as hell looked like we were going to see a lot. With Longshore as the QB, 19 of the 34 snaps were from shotgun and 15 were from under center (56% shotgun, 44% under center). This stat doesn’t tell us much other than the gun/under-center ratio, but it does lead into the next piece of analysis which is to discover our run/pass ratio when in gun versus when under center. This data should reveal whether Dunbar has a tendency to run or pass based on where the QB takes the snap.
Of the 15 snaps that Longshore was under center, 10 plays were runs (66%), and 5 were passes (33%). Of the 19 snaps that Longshore was in the gun, 2 plays were runs (11%), and 17 were passes (89%). Below is a chart which helps visualize the probability of a play being under center or from shotgun, and if it will be a run or pass play based on the location of the quarterback. Shotgun plays are in blue hues, and Under plays are in yellow hues.
As you can see, there was a slight tendancy for Dunbar to run the ball when the quarterback is under center. This makes sense because when the quarterback was under center a fullback or a 2nd tight end was also on the field instead of a wide receiver. In addition, the presence of a 2nd TE or a FB provides better blocking in addition to blocking closer to the point of attack on runs. As for the playcalling, despite showing a small tendency to run the ball when under center, this tendency is not too far from a 60/40 run/pass ratio when the quarterback is under center which is normal of past Tedford offenses.
Regarding the quarterback in shotgun, Dunbar had a huge tendency to call passing plays when the quarterback was in gun. Recall that 17 out of 19 shotgun plays were passes (89%). Basically, this glaring tendency was tipping Cal’s hand to the Tennessee defense.
Now, passing a lot from shotgun isn’t a bad thing if a team can do it for consistent gains and first downs. If this is the case then teams can forgo running from shotgun altogether. Unfortunately for Cal, this was not the case.
Ideally, Cal should have been running from shotgun in roughly the same amount that we passed. Then the Tennessee defense would have to respect the potential threat of a run. Instead, the Tennessee CBs could focus on shutting down our WRs and not worry about run support. Furthermore, the Tennessee defensive ends could pass rush the quarterback and go for the sack instead of protecting from a potential run threat.
So, you might be wondering why Cal didn’t run more from shotgun? The plain and simple answer is that they had to pass. Recall that I stated Cal was faced with 14 passing situations (out of Longshore’s 34 snaps! That’s 41% of the time!). I’m talkin’ MUST PASS situations like 3rd and 8, 2nd and 18, 3rd and 12. In these dire situations Cal needs to pass. Dunbar is faced with the choice to pass from shotgun or from under center. The big idea behind a shotgun snap is that the quarterback has more time to read the defense than when dropping back from under center besides the quarterback not have to worry about the dropback. Given these widely accepted beliefs, the logical choice is to put the quarterback in shotgun. In fact, the logic is justified in the evidence: out of those 14 must pass situations, Dunbar went to shotgun all but once, and called 11 shotgun passing plays (that’s 11 shotgun passes out of 13 shotgun must pass situations).
So here is where we all say "AH HA!". Because here is when we all realize that Dunbar’s tendency to pass when in shotgun is not a tendency of choice, but of necessity.
Just think, if we weren’t forced into so many passing situations, we wouldn’t have had to pass from shotgun so much, and our run/pass ratio from shotgun would have been something more acceptable such as a 35/65 or a 40/60 run/pass ratio. Instantly our offense is more balanced, the Tennessee defense is kept off balance, any given play has a greater chance at succeeding, greater odds in our favor mean more yards, more yards mean more points, and more points mean a greater chance of winning.
So now the question is: why was Cal forced into so many passing situations?
Well, unless you have completely erased the Tennessee game from your memory you might recall Cal’s WRs dropping passes. You might remember the Tennessee defense stuffing Cal’s future starting RB Justin Forsett for a 0.2 yard rush average. You might remember how 9 out of 12 of Lynch’s runs were below his final season average. You might remember 3 false starts by the Cal offensive linemen. You might remember how Longshore was sacked 3 times for a loss of 20 total yards - and when he wasn’t sacked he was hurried or hit. Or how only 2 out of the 14 plays from shotgun in must-pass situations actually resulted in a 7+ yard gain or a first down.
Plain and simple, Cal was out-played.
Was Cal out-played AND out-coached? I will tackle that question tomorrow…
