Well, when discussing why college baseball is so much less popular than the major leagues, the first thing to bring up is the most obvious difference between them; aluminum bats.  Why does this difference matter?  Reader bowbasaur summed it up succinctly: "aluminum bats suck".

First, a little history.  Aluminum bats were introduced to the college game in 1974 as a cost-saving measure; although they can cost 5 times as much as wooden bats, they’ll last a lot longer than 5 wooden ones will.  Athletic Departments across the nation were in a budget crunch at the time, and this was intended to be a temporary measure.  However, like the monstrosity that is Evans Hall, it’s still standing today.  Aluminum bats have both their proponents and detractors, but because of the cost difference, I’m pretty sure we’ll never see a switch back unless MLB is willing to subsidize the cost.

To be sure, aluminum bats have made the college game a different one than the professional version.  Inside pitches, instead of sawing off the hitter’s bat, can now be fought off into left field for a hit.  Balls travel further and faster, leading to more home runs, but also more pitchers hit by line drives.  It’s a different game, but I can’t say it’s that much better or worse.  Besides, the general public doesn’t seem to have a problem with differing amateur and pro versions.  The NBA has a longer 3-point line and 4 15-minute quarters instead of 20-minute halves, yet each is plenty popular.  The NFL and the NCAA have vastly different overtime rules, yet neither version seems to turn off many people.  Yes, aluminum bats have made college baseball a slightly different game, but you certainly can’t say that the game being different accounts for the difference in popularity.

Now, do aluminum bats themselves make the game less popular?  That’s hard to say.  I’ll admit, I don’t like them.  The ‘pinging’ noise they make just sounds wrong.  And yet, the couple times I went to Cal games this year, I didn’t enjoy myself any less because of them.  You can get used to it, and you can get over it.  Can I honestly say I would have gone to more games had they used wooden bats?  That seems like a stretch to me.

Expanding to the general populace, can we say that aluminum bats are that big of a turnoff?  I doubt it.  Sure, there are people who cite them as a reason they don’t like to watch college ball, but there are an equal number of people who believe that the current increase in college baseball’s popularity (and yes, it is increasing, though it’s still a far cry from the major sports) is due to the increase in offense that aluminum bats afford.  Remember the summer of ‘98?  Sammy v. Big Mac?  Chicks dig the long ball.

My main problem with the argument that college baseball isn’t popular because of aluminum bats is that it always comes from purists:  people who love the game as it used to be.  These are the same people that hate interleague play and the wild card, yet those two innovations have done wonders for MLB’s popularity.  Purists may grumble, but for the most part they love the game so much they’ll never turn away from it.  The general sporting audience doesn’t care about tradition; they care about excitement.  Complain about aluminum bats all you want, but I don’t think you can blame them for college baseball’s relative obscurity.

So in last week’s poll we asked our readers to vote on a name for the Student Section (results of last week’s poll can be seen here at our new poll results page).

We thought we picked out the best possible names for the Student Section.  Come on, Bear Territory isn’t so bad.  Is it?  The Domicile isn’t bad either.  Okay, so The Epicenter might have been a little too nerdy but it’s also kind of cool when you think about its significance. 

But apparently we missed the best and most obvious name for the Student Section since 41% of 83 voters voted for "other".

So please do tell us, because I am dying to know, what name for the Student Section could possibly be better than Bear Territory?

In case you failed to notice (and I’m guessing you did), Cal Baseball’s season ended yesterday. The Bears went up to Seattle last weekend hoping they could win enough to garner a postseason bid, but after winning Friday to clinch 4th place in the Pac-10, the Bears dropped both weekend games to Washington. Then, when the NCAA Regional fields were announced yesterday, Cal was (once again) on the outside looking in.

Now, this would be the point where most sportswriters would start to wonder about Head Coach Dave Esquer’s job security. After all, despite this year’s 4th place finish, Esquer’s second-highest ever, his program has been decidedly mediocre. In 8 years, Esquer’s teams have a combined record of 230-215, a tepid .517 winning percentage. They have made the postseason once, in 2001, when they tied for 3rd in the Pac-10. It’s not terrible, and almost certainly not bad enough to get Esquer fired, especially in a non-revenue sport, but it sure isn’t exciting, and it’s not going to bring new fans out to the ballpark.

However, the lack of excitement surrounding Cal Baseball is hardly unique to Cal, and it’s hardly Esquer’s fault. Why doesn’t anyone even notice when Cal misses the postseason? Why are there only a few hundred to a few thousand fans at a Cal Baseball game? Why is baseball generally considered a non-revenue sport? These are questions I’m more interested in.

There’s no question that football is the most popular sport in America right now. The NFL is king, and pigskin dominates the NCAA landscape. Among the professional ranks, basketball and baseball follow at 2 and 3, the order depending on the survey you’re citing. Yet, while college basketball is a big deal, and the NCAA tournament provides the lion’s share of the NCAA’s annual budget, hardly anyone pays attention to college baseball. Can you even name last year’s College World Series winner? How about the last five winners? I can’t even do that. Now, try the same exercises with college football and basketball. Big difference, huh?

With so many baseball fans out there, why don’t any of them care about the college game? Why doesn’t the popularity translate? I’m a huge baseball fan, and yet even I hardly pay any attention to Cal baseball. In fact (and I have no numbers to back this up), I’ll bet you more people play fantasy baseball than watch college baseball. Heck, the Little League World Series gets about as much press as the College World Series does.

I’ve got a few theories on why baseball gets relegated to the ‘Other Sports’ section of the ESPN college page with the likes of tennis, softball, and track & field, but I certainly don’t have a definitive answer. Still, I’ll roll out a few of those theories over the next few days, examine them, and see if we can’t come to some sort of better understanding of the situation.  It would be nice to have another sport to obsess over during the time between March Madness and two-a-days, wouldn’t it?

I recently posted about a competitor to Google Maps, Windows Live Local.   And how great their view of Memorial Stadium could be.  Read it here.

Well, Google Maps has a new feature called Street View.   As you might guess, it gives you a street view of where you are standing.  And like some sort of early 90s turn-based RPG, you can slowly, but surely walk around.  It is very limited so far, but they do have it for Berkeley.

So, if you are STILL going through Memorial Stadium Withdrawal (even after the Windows Live Local post), here is about as close to the front entrance as you can get whilst sitting at your computer.

I like to imagine it streaming with people in blue and gold.   

In The Tennessee Debacle: Out-played or Out-coached? Part I, Ken Crawford brought up the following point:

"One thing that you should be careful with in regards to the play-calling is the audibles. I re-watched the entire season in February in preparation for a series of articles that never got published. One thing I noted about the Tennessee game was that Longshore called a lot of audibles and the combination of a young QB and the noise made that a horrible decision.

If I were Tedford, after the second series, I would have made the call to either eliminate audibles or come up with a visual system with only one option for change (of course it’s difficult to coordinate something like that mid-game, making me think ‘no audibles’ would be the appropriate decision). I also noted that Ayoob when he came in called fewer and that the crowd noise has substantially abated the few times he did call an audible.

In any case, it may have been that Dunbar was counting on a lot of audible situations in his game-plan and the inability to do that caused lots of predictable play-calling. I’d still fault the coaches for that game-plan considering the environment they were heading into. They should have known that a game-plan with lots of audibling was trouble for a young QB in an insanely loud stadium."

Ken brings up the good point that the playcalling might have suffered due to the "audibles".  But before I address this point, I need to explain a few things.

When we use the word "audible", I am sure most people are thinking that Longshore took matters into his own hands and changed the play at the line of scrimmage to another play that he thought would be more effective against what the defense was showing.  More specifically, that Longshore has complete control to call any play at the line of scrimmage if he thinks he may better exploit the defense.

While what was described above is the definition of an audible, the assumption that Longshore is actually audibling is incorrect.

For the most part, college football head coaches do not allow their quarterbacks to do their best Peyton Manning impressions during games.  In other words, most college football head coaches simply do not allow their quarterbacks the complete freedom to audible to any play.  

If my memory serves me correctly, I believe that there was some talk about Pete Carroll allowing Matt Leinart to audible in his senior year.  But other than that, I cannot recall hearing any college football coaches admitting that they allow their quarterback the complete freedom to audible to any play they want. 

Furthermore, I doubt that Tedford has allowed any of his quarterbacks to audible to any play at the line of scrimmage.  Yes, even our beloved Aaron Rodgers probably didn’t get the blessing from the God that is Tedford. 

What looks to be an "audible" is actually an option play.  

No, I’m not talking about the Navy or Air Force triple-option, or the old school Nebraska option, or the West Virginia or Texas shotgun option.  I’m talkin’ about an option play with two plays.  In other words, the offense goes to the line of scrimmage with two plays in mind - thus the "option" to choose (many NFL teams do the same thing with even more options).  But unlike the Navy option, the actual "option" to choose occurs before the snap and not after. 

After the offense lines up at the line of scrimmage, the quarterback reads the defense and tells the offense to run one of the two plays.  I refrain from saying that the quarterback has the "choice" to call the play because it’s not really a choice.  The quarterback is taught to read the defense and simply choose the play based on the formation of the defense.  It’s as if the defense is actually choosing their own fate based on what they show.  Longshore is in no way choosing any play out of the hundreds of plays he may know.  It’s simply one play or the other.    

So with that whole "audible" issue being clarified, let’s tackle the problem of using option plays in a hostile environment.  

The most obvious problem is crowd noise.  Mr. Crawford brings up this point and suggests that it might have been better to not have any option plays at all in a deafening environment.  He has a valid point.  If there are no option plays, then excess verbal communication is minimized.  The offense simply runs the play and all that needs to happen is the center hearing the snap count.  But of course, the trade off is that the offense gives up the advantage of the choice that an option play brings to the field. 

Mr. Crawford also brings up the suggestion of developing a visual system for notifying the offense of which play is to be run.  He is thinking like a coach because the Cal coaching staff does have a visual system in place.  I do not wish to further elaborate on how the signaling works for obvious reasons but trust me, there is a visual signal system in place. 

But even though there is a visual system in place, vocal notifications still must be used.  Afterall, the OL cannot turn around to see the signals so their notification of changes must occur vocally - WRs and RBs simply need to look at the QB to see the signals.

(In rare playcalling situations that will not be elaborated on, the backfield and WRs may need to hear a vocal command.  I believe one of these rare situations did occur in the Tennessee game and resulted in a tense moment of Longshore trying to verbally communicate over the Tennessee crowd noise which became even louder at the sight of him verbally communicating.  I believe the coaching staff realized the problem with those special playcalling situations in a hostile environment and avoided them throughout the rest of the year because I did not see any further clues to suggest that one of those rare playcalling situations had occured.)

The obvious problem about using option plays is that they require more time at the line of scrimmage.  Longshore must make sure to get to the LOS with plenty of time on the play clock so he may evaluate the defense and make the appropriate decision. 

An additional benefit of option plays - besides the aforementioned ability to choose the better play - is the possibility of setting up the defense.  Often defensive players will be trying to decode the offense’s hand signals and verbal codes.  After a few instances of verbal or physical signaling, the offense will continue to use those signals regardless of what the real play may be thus confusing the defense (because the defense will have seen the same signals result in two different plays).  An even deadlier trick is when the offense calls a play that is a counter to the defense’s counter to what the defense thinks the play may be.  For example, if the defense thinks that the offense is calling play A, they will call their best counter defense such as play B, but the offense is really in play C which is not only a counter to the defense’s play B but gives the same look as play A (for an example of this refer to Cal @ Washington in 2002).  Naturally, Tedford is very good at this because he is a master at chess, a genius, and God. 

Anyways, back to option plays and Tennessee.   

Mr. Crawford notes that Ayoob was given less option plays.  This is true, but has nothing to do with the fact that there was a QB switch.  Simply, Dunbar prefers to to run option plays out of formations that Ayoob did not see many reps with as the QB (please excuse the vague statement but it’s for our own benefit). 

Was the coaching staff at fault for calling so many option plays?  Yes and no.  I say yes because in that kind of environment you have to do what you can to minimize the chances of unforced errors caused by trying to do too much.  But then again, I say no because in most situations the offense should still have been able to function regardless of the crowd noise (unless it was absolutely so loud on the field that the OL couldn’t even hear each other or Longshore’s commands despite only being a few feet away from each other).

It is a lot to ask of a (pretty much) freshman quarterback to not only excel in such an important and high profile game, but to manage the offense in such hostile conditions.  One could say the coaching staff was asking too much of Longshore.  But then again, I’m sure that the coaching staff must have had faith in Longshore’s abilities and thought there was nothing to suggest he couldn’t handle those responsibilities, because otherwise they wouldn’t have put him in such precarious situations. 

Earlier this week, Hydrotech reacted to a blog entry by the Merc’s Jon Wilner, pointing out that while Cal does pay its football coach significantly more than its professors, it is not because Cal values one more than the other, but because they are in entirely different markets, and Cal is willing to pay market rate for world-class employees in both cases.  A very good (and subtle) point, it’s worth reiterating.

I, however, want to touch on a different aspect of Wilner’s breakdown of Tedford’s contract; the buyout clauses.  In every discussion of a successful coach’s contract, the subject of the buyout clauses are brought up; fans want to see some monetary valuation on how insured they are against their football coach heading for greener pastures.  Here’s what Wilner has to say:

*** Under the old deal, if Tedford left Cal before the end of the contract, he owed the university $300,000 for every year left on the deal. (The buyout amount was chopped to $150,000 annually until the Memorial Stadium renovation broke ground.)

But clearly, he has far less (financial) incentive to stay through the duration of the new contract.

OK, yeah, Tedford’s got a strong bargaining position, and he (and his agent) used that to their advantage.  I’ve no problem with that.  He gets more money up front, and he leaves less money on the table if he decides to leave early.  Good for him, he deserves it.

Still, for the Cal fan wondering if Tedford will leave, none of this matters.  Honestly, when have you ever heard of a coach’s buyout clause being the reason he stayed at his current job?  Is that the reason you’d want him to stay anyway?  Listen, any school or NFL franchise that tried to hire Tedford away would have to give him more money than he’s currently making; anybody with a great job is going to need a heck of a reason to leave for less money, and the only one I can think of is ‘returning to your mid-major alma mater’.  As far as I know, Fresno State’s not hiring, and Tedford’s too competitive to take a step down such as that.

So, we’re limited to only a few rich schools and the NFL.  Any of those teams that can afford to throw scads of money at Tedford can afford the buyout as a matter of course; the retention bonuses are tempting, sure, but if someone’s giving you a huge raise right now, a big bonus a few years down the road isn’t as big a deal as the schools like it to be.  In fact, what these clauses mostly amount to is negotiating leverage when a coach does decide to leave; the financials are only a negotiating point, not a reason one way or the other.

Coaching searches are interesting beasts.  Once a candidate is chosen, the employer will pay whatever it takes to get that #1 choice.  Settling for the second-best coach is not an option.  Colleges are especially guilty of this, because they can’t go out and sign free agents to fix their teams.  With a moribund program and money in their pocket, all these schools can do is throw money at the best coach who will agree to come.

Look, I’m not saying whether Tedford will or will not leave.  What I am saying is that money won’t be the reason he leaves.  If he does leave, it will be because a) he’ll feel he’s done all he can at the college level, and needs a new (NFL) challenge, or b) he feels he’s held back from succeeding because of the stagnating condition of the facilities at Cal.  Yes, it’s nice that he signed his new contract, but if he’s thinking about leaving in two years, I wouldn’t look to the buyout clauses to keep him around.

After talking up how Rodgers would do well to emulate Tom Brady’s previous behavior by working overtime to build up loyalty within the Packers players and organization, Seth Wickersham strikes back with this, in an article about livening up NFL minicamps:

4. Scrap official team minicamps for more creative ones. You could have the "Hands Off Camp," featuring John Abraham, Jevon Kearse, and Donovan McNabb. Or the "You Wish You Could Pull This" camp, featuring NFL players with celebrity girlfriends. Or the "We Thought Jeff Tedford Would Help Our NFL Careers" camp with Trent Dilfer, Joey Harrington, Akili Smith, Kyle Boller, and a few others.

He didn’t explicitly name Rodgers, but I’m sure he would be included in the "few others" category.  (Incidentally, that comment wounds me deeply on two levels.  Come on, Eagles!  Keep those guys healthy!)  But as for the Tedford Effect, does it really exist?  From Projecting Rookie Quarterbacks, by David Lewin in Pro Football Prospectus 2006:

At first, I built a regression model to project NFL success based on career DPAR per game.  I tried a number of different variables in the regression, although due to the small sample size of college games, I was somewhat limited.  In the end, two factors stood out far above the all others: completion percentage and games started.  Statistics like attempts, completions, and yards were relevant, but are highly collinear with games started and not quite as statistically significant, so they were left out.  Height proved not to be statistically significant, and neither did draft position (an issue discussed further below)…

So what do these numbers mean?  Beginning with games started, these finds probably have two meanings.  One, more college experience usually leads to better NFL performance.  This makes sense, as anyone who has played quarterback could tell you. 

The second implication is, perhaps, more interesting.  The correlation of a high number of games started with greater NFL success indicates that the more games played in college, the better the job scouts do at evaluating players.  While this is not always the case — Cade McNown is the most prominent exception — it is a clear trend.  It makes sense that the more film available on a player, the better that scouts known his talent level.  There are quarterbacks who started a lot of college games and posted good numbers, but scouts saw enough of them to know they lacked NFL talent.  Chris Rix, who started 38 games for Florida State, in a good example; scouts saw him play a lot in college and knew he wasn’t very good; consequently he went undrafted.  Imagine instead if Rix had come out after leading Florida State to a 10-3 record in his junior year.  With only two seasons as a starter at the college level, scouts might have seen him as "projectable," a proven winner with athleticism and a strong arm.  Kliff Kingsbury is another example; he was a wildly successful four-year starter in Texas Tech’s spread offense, but scouts saw enough of him to know he was a sixth-round project instead of a first-round prospect…

The second college statistic that points to NFL success is completion percentage, which is fairly straightforward.  Accuracy, though somewhat dependent on the system and the quality of each player’s receivers and opponents, carries over from college to the NFL.  Completion percentage is more relevant than touchdown percentage and interception percentage because it is based on significantly more observations (there are many more completions than touchdowns or interceptions) and is less dependent on the situation.

Essentially, higher DPAR is good, the more games started the better, and you can’t teach accuracy at the next level.  The bulk of Lewin’s analysis studies the 27 first-round quarterbacks taken within the 10 years prior to his study (1997-2006), which includes former pupils of our Lord and Savior, Akili Smith, David Carr, Joey Harrington, Kyle Boller, and Aaron Rodgers.

After studying the statistics and coming to the conclusion that games started and completion percentage were the most important numbers that should be used in evaluating quarterbacks, Lewin says of each:

Akili Smith
Age-adjusted DPAR/G projection: 0.42
Actual age-adjusted DPAR/G: -0.40

Smith is a perfect example of why teams need to consider college statistics, not just scouting reports.  Smith started only 19 games and completed only 56.6% of his passes in his two years at Oregon.  Despite having the talent that scouts drool over, Smith was one of the biggest busts in recent memory.

David Carr
Age-adjusted DPAR/G projection: 3.62
Actual age-adjusted DPAR/G: 1.28

If you normalize sacks to the league average, Carr’s numbers actually look decent…Carr posted impressive numbers at Fresno State, especially his senior year.  He threw for 46 touchdowns and 4,839 yards, completing 64.5% of his passes.  While Carr was probably unworthy of the number one overall selection, he has a chance to become an above-average quarterback over the next two or three years.

Joey Harrington
Age-adjusted DPAR/G projection: 1.28
Actual age-adjusted DPAR/G: 1.66

Harrington fooled scouts coming out of college in large part because of the hype from his Heisman campaign, funded by Nike CEO and Oregon booster Phil Knight.  His senior numbers were good, but definitely not Heisman caliber.  Scouts liked Harrington’s leadership ability, good arm strength, and size.  His stats however, tell a different story: fewer than 30 games started and a completion rate of 55%…Once Daunte Culpepper has fully healed, Harrington will probably spend the rest of his career on the bench, Cade McNown-style.

Kyle Boller
Age-adjusted DPAR/G projection: 0.55
Actual age-adjusted DPAR/G: 2.58

Boller rocketed into the first-round on the strength of his postseason workouts, which is almost always a bad sign.  In fact, one of the most impressive things Boller did at these workouts was kneel at the 50-yard line and throw the ball through the uprights.  Scouts thought this demonstrated a spectacular arm.  Anyone who has watched Boller play (ed. note - me, Ragnarok, and TwistNHook) knows he has good but not great arm strength…Boller also ran a 4.6 in the 40-yard dash, which everyone knows is pretty much meaningless for a quarterback.  By this time, scouts were in love.  Boller could do no wrong.  This was news to Kyle, as he had done a lot of wrong (48 interceptions) in college at the University of California.

Boller was a four-year starter at Cal.  Normally this is good, because that means there is a lot of film to watch and scouts know pretty well if you are a first-round talent or not.  In this case, the process somehow failed.  If Billick has bothered to watch Boller’s college game film, he would have noticed that the object of his desire completed only 47.8% of his passes in college.  In the modern era there has never been a successful NFL quarterback with a college completion percentage so low.  When Boller’s low completion percentage and overall abysmal college performance were pointed out, scouts would respond that Boller made progress in his senior season, when he threw 28 touchdown passes.  It is true that Boller was much improved as a senior.  However he still completed only 53% of his passes.

Aaron Rodgers
Age-adjusted DPAR/G projection: 3.33

Rodgers is unlikely to get much of a chance in 2006, but when he does he should become a solid but unspectacular NFL player, along the lines of Brian Griese.  Like Griese, he is in the unenviable situation of following a legend.  No one can really live up to Favre’s legacy, and Rodgers is definitely not going to be able to.  I expect the Packers to draft another quarterback as soon as Rodgers gets enough playing time to show the Packers what he is: a decidedly average player.

And herein lies the rub.

At Cal, Rodgers was coached by Jeff Tedford.  This puts him in an unfortunate group of recent first-round quarterbacks that includes Joey Harrington, Akili Smith, David Carr, and Kyle Boller.  Originally I thought that I might need a Jeff Tedford variable that reduces a player’s projection.  After running the numbers, it turns out that there was no trend with these guys over- or underperforming their projections.  Tedford quarterbacks just somehow look better to scouts than their numbers justify.

There you have it.  There’s no magic here; indeed, it would seem that our glorious leader doesn’t actually inflate his quarterbacks’ numbers at all.  Their performance at the NFL level is right at what their college numbers would say it is, so it’s hard to understand why scouts might on the one hand decry the Tedford Effect that causes them to take his proteges higher than their NFL performance deserves, and then propogate it by drafting them higher than their college track record deserves.  So the next time you hear from someone that Jeff Tedford quarterbacks are all first-round busts, tell them that they really shouldn’t have gone in the first round to begin with, and should be viewed accordingly.  Blame the scouts in this instance, not our coach.

A few links which mention our Bears (One in particular) that don’t really cover any new ground and don’t warrant a full post on their own, but do warrant your attention.

• Heisman Pundit’s (somewhat old) rundown of the top 20 candidates for the Heisman Trophy headed into the 2007 college football season, which includes DeSean at number 8. 
• Another article from CSTV.com breaking down the Heisman race, drawing parallels between The One and Tim Brown (good), Charles Woodson (good and bad), and Desmond Howard (awful).  Can we just go ahead and give DeSean that nickname already?  I’m working as hard as I can on it.  It fits.  Let’s run with it.
• On last night’s edition of Sportscenter, Kirk Herbstreit called The One the best wide receiver and most explosive player in college football, since Ted Ginn Jr. decided to rehab on the Dolphins’ dime.
• SI.com’s short mention of The Big Game battle between the NFL and Cal/Stanford that was previously covered here by TwistNHook…not because SI’s coverage was interesting, but because of the comments.
• Bruce Feldman chat which includes him saying Cal can be a top 10 team.
• "Please don’t judge my son by his appearance. When you see this black guy with dreadlocks and gold in his mouth, don’t put him down as some thug. Get to know Marshawn and you’ll know he’s a much different character.’ - Delisa Lynch on her son Marshawn, who was the Bills’ first-round pick.

The Tennessee Debacle: Out-played or Out-coached?  Part I

The Tennessee Debacle: Out-played or Out-coached?  Part II

Continuing on with the Tennessee Debacle series, here is the third and final part:

Offensively, Dunbar’s playcalling was actually pretty decent given the circumstances.  Now I know a bunch of you ol’ Blues who are still bitter over the loss are probably thinking I’m blowing smoke up Dunbar’s ass, but I’m not.   

Dunbar maintained an good variation in his personnel packages in liberty situations.  Below is a pie chart to show his personnel packages in 20 liberty plays.

As you can see, Dunbar does have a tendency to use 21 personnel (two runningbacks, one tight end, [2 wide receivers is implicit]).  But this package is the main I-Formation personnel set, so a tendency to use this personnel package is expected.  In fact, the fact that Dunbar is putting 21 personnel on the field in liberty situations shows his adherence to Tedford’s philosophy of using a pro-style offense. 

The occasional use of 12 personnel (one back, two tight ends) is also a reflection of Dunbar’s utilization of another pro-style personnel package.  If you watch the NFL, you might know that many NFL teams are currently carrying two quality TEs on their roster for use in twin TE packages. 

The most significant part of the personnel package pie chart above is the fact that Dunbar utilized 11 personnel (one back, one tight end) in liberty situations.  You’re probably wondering why this is significant.  First of all, 11 personnel utilizes 1 RB, 1 TE, and 3 WRs.  Second, every time Dunbar utilized 11 personnel he put the QB in shotgun.  Third, remember that the statistics showed that Dunbar passed 89% of the time from shotgun.  Putting those three facts all together: if 11 personnel -> QB in shotgun -> 89% chance of pass.  Showing a passing personnel package, and a passing formation in liberty situations keeps the defense off balance as long as you run occasionally. 

Imagine that you are the defense.  It is 1st and 10 and the offense comes out in a personnel package and a formation that you know they are extremely like to pass.  Are they going to pass?  It certainly seems like it but it’s 1st and 10!  It’s not 3rd and long.  It’s first and 10.  Ultimately, the offense has the choice to run or pass on first down.  So what are they going to do?  You don’t know.  In fact, shotgun spread teams such as West Virginia thrive on this very confusing look. 

So obviously, Dunbar is attempting to keep the defense off balance by mixing in some shotgun spread in liberty situations.  Because obviously, if you only utilize 11 personnel with the quarterback in shotgun and pass in must-pass situations, then the defense will know that you’re going to pass.  But if you use 11 personnel with the quarterback in shotgun in liberty situations, things get confusing for the defense.  Things get even more confusing and threatening when you can run a deadly shotgun option (once again, think West Virginia). 

Another statistic that will vouch for Dunbar’s playcalling abilities is the fact that he adjusted to the horrible offensive linemen protection and Tennessee’s constant pressuring of Longshore.  In Cal’s 4th possession - by which time it became very apparent that Cal’s OL was being dominated - Dunbar began rolling out the pocket.  From that possession on, Dunbar sprinkled in seven plays that rolled the pocket either left or right in an effort to alleviate pressure on Longshore (7 roll out plays out of 34 total plays for Longshore is 20.6% roll out percentage). 

The only fault Dunbar might have made in the Tennessee game was the fact that he did not call enough deception plays.  When I say deception plays, I’m talking about playaction plays, draws, and screens.  These are deception plays because they deceive the defense.  For example, on a playaction play the defense is deceived into thinking it’s a run play when it’s really a pass play.  A draw play looks like a pass but is a run.  And a screen looks like a bad protection play, but it’s really a good protection play. 

During last year’s Tennessee game, Dunbar only called 6 deception plays (out of Longshore’s 34 snaps).  Four were screens, one was a draw, and one was a hard play action (hard playaction defined as when the QB turns his back to the defense as opposed to light play action where his back is never fully turned and he gives a quick and less deceiving hand-off pump with his arms).  Essentially, about two in every eleven plays were deception plays.  This number should probably be a little bit higher.  Utilizing more playaction plays could have taken advantage of Tennessee’s aggressive defense.  On the other hand, Dunbar’s calling of four screen plays was clearly an attempt to take advantage of Tennessee’s frequent blitzing.  Obviously, he knew that the Tennessee D was being aggressive and getting penetration, so he attempted to exploit it.

Regarding any tendencies that Dunbar had in terms of down and run/pass, there weren’t any.  On twelve 1st down plays, Dunbar called 7 runs and 5 passes (58.3% run, 41.7% pass).  On five 2nd and medium distances (4 to 8 yards), Dunbar called 3 runs and 2 passes (60% run, 40% pass).  On a single 2nd and short play (inches to 3 yards), Dunbar played it safe and ran the ball (100% run). 

Regarding any tendencies that Dunbar had in terms of personnel package and down, there were a few. But keep in mind that a personnel tendency is not that bad (having a run/pass tendency during a specific down and distance is worse). 

On first downs Dunbar came out with 21 personnel 50% of the time, 12 personnel 25% of the time, 11 personnel 16.7% of the time, and any other personnel sets 8.3% of the time.  Obviously these statistics show that Dunbar is attempting to use a pro-style offense in liberty situations.

On 2nd and medium distances, Dunbar came out with 21 personnel 75% of the time, and 12 personnel 25% of the time.  Again, Dunbar is attempting to utilize a pro-set offense in liberty situations.

On 2nd and long distances, Dunbar came out in 11 personnel 100% of the time.  Recall that 11 personnel = 1 RB, 1 TE, and 3 WRs.  Recall that 11 personnel = QB in shotgun = 89% pass.  Obviously, Dunbar is conceding all run efforts when faced with 2nd and long, and doing so with the QB only in shotgun and in a pass heavy personnel set.  A more balanced approach to passing on 2nd and longs would be to either use 11 personnel with the QB under center, or pass using a different personnel package. 

On 3rd and longs, Dunbar came out in 11 personnel 100% of the time (9 out of 9 instances to be specific, and also with the QB in gun all 9 times too!).  I find this to be somewhat troubling.  While I do acknowledge the advantages of a shotgun snap, the fact that Dunbar showed no variety in the location of the QB on 3rd and long plays leads me to believe that for some reason the coaching staff didn’t want Longshore dropping back on obvious passing situations.  Why?  I don’t know.  Maybe the coaching staff just wants Longshore to concentrate on the reads and not the drop.  Maybe his dropback technique and rhythm were not what it should have been at the time.  Or maybe nothing was of concern, and it’s just that the coaching staff felt that having a QB take a drop on 3rd and long situations was playing into Tennessee’s hands and strengths. 

All in all, the failure of Cal’s offense against Tennessee’s defense was because of the losing battle in the trenches.  The offensive line could not provide adequate protection, Longshore became rattled, and the pressure hampered Longshore’s effectiveness.   As for the run blocking, the run blocking was fair, no huge holes were opened up but Marshawn was able to grind out some tough yardage on occasion. 

So in conclusion, Dunbar’s playcalling was decent and I would have to reject the hypothesis that Dunbar was at fault for the Tennessee loss.  If I had to give it a grade I would give it a B (please note that I am not grading him on how well he attacked Tennessee’s weaknesses and tendencies.  I did not scout Tennessee’s tendencies or their players.  I do not know what Dunbar’s gameplan was, but I am simply grading him on the results of what he chose to do).  I know you guys must think I’m crazy but Dunbar did what he could given the circumstances.  With the OL not protecting and blocking like normal, it put the offense - and Dunbar - in difficult situations.  Like the saying goes, "games are won in the trenches".  Last year’s Cal @ Tennessee game was truly a case of "games are won in the trenches".  Tennessee won in the trenches and stymied Cal’s offense.

Check back on Saturday as I will address the audibling situation that Ken Crawford brought up in the comments section of The Tennessee Debacle: Out-played or Out-coached? Part I.   

The Tennessee Debacle: Out-played or Out-coached?  Part I

Continuing on with the Tennessee Debacle analysis, the following is part II and the beginning of the statistical analysis:

There were 34 total plays when Longshore was the QB.  Of those 34 plays, 22 of the plays were passing plays and 12 of the plays were running plays (65% pass, 35% run).  These results are fairly abnormal.  In the past, Tedford’s offenses were a "run first" offense and ran the ball 5% to 10% more than they passed.  Based on these results it seems as if Dunbar’s offensive ideology is already deviating from Tedford’s ideology.  But what these results hide are instances where Cal might have been forced into passing situations, and did not have the option of running to maintain a more balanced run/pass ratio.

In fact, with Longshore as the QB, Cal’s offense was faced with 14 passing situations.  Situations such as 3rd and 15, 3rd and 7, 2nd and 19, and 3rd and 18.  If Cal was not forced into passing situations and these downs were 3rd and 3, or 2nd and 7, Cal would have the liberty to choose run or pass.  Now just for kicks, let’s dream that these 14 passing situations were instead liberty situations where Cal could choose run or pass.  Let’s just say that of those 14 plays Cal ran and passed 50% of the time.  That’s 7 more running plays and 7 less passing plays.  Cal then would have ran the ball 19 times and passed the ball 15 times (56% run, 44% pass) for a much more balanced run/pass ratio.

The next statistic I want to talk about is the percentage of shotgun snaps used versus the amount of under-center snaps.  Remember the big question going into last season was "how much shotgun is Dunbar going to use?"  And after watching the Tennessee game, it sure as hell looked like we were going to see a lot.  With Longshore as the QB, 19 of the 34 snaps were from shotgun and 15 were from under center (56% shotgun, 44% under center).  This stat doesn’t tell us much other than the gun/under-center ratio, but it does lead into the next piece of analysis which is to discover our run/pass ratio when in gun versus when under center.  This data should reveal whether Dunbar has a tendency to run or pass based on where the QB takes the snap.

Of the 15 snaps that Longshore was under center, 10 plays were runs (66%), and 5 were passes (33%).  Of the 19 snaps that Longshore was in the gun, 2 plays were runs (11%), and 17 were passes (89%).  Below is a chart which helps visualize the probability of a play being under center or from shotgun, and if it will be a run or pass play based on the location of the quarterback.  Shotgun plays are in blue hues, and Under plays are in yellow hues.

As you can see, there was a slight tendancy for Dunbar to run the ball when the quarterback is under center.  This makes sense because when the quarterback was under center a fullback or a 2nd tight end was also on the field instead of a wide receiver.  In addition, the presence of a 2nd TE or a FB provides better blocking in addition to blocking closer to the point of attack on runs.  As for the playcalling, despite showing a small tendency to run the ball when under center, this tendency is not too far from a 60/40 run/pass ratio when the quarterback is under center which is normal of past Tedford offenses. 

Regarding the quarterback in shotgun, Dunbar had a huge tendency to call passing plays when the quarterback was in gun.   Recall that 17 out of 19 shotgun plays were passes (89%).  Basically, this glaring tendency was tipping Cal’s hand to the Tennessee defense.

Now, passing a lot from shotgun isn’t a bad thing if a team can do it for consistent gains and first downs.  If this is the case then teams can forgo running from shotgun altogether.  Unfortunately for Cal, this was not the case.   

Ideally, Cal should have been running from shotgun in roughly the same amount that we passed.  Then the Tennessee defense would have to respect the potential threat of a run.  Instead, the Tennessee CBs could focus on shutting down our WRs and not worry about run support.  Furthermore, the Tennessee defensive ends could pass rush the quarterback and go for the sack instead of protecting from a potential run threat. 

So, you might be wondering why Cal didn’t run more from shotgun?  The plain and simple answer is that they had to pass.  Recall that I stated Cal was faced with 14 passing situations (out of Longshore’s 34 snaps!  That’s 41% of the time!).  I’m talkin’ MUST PASS situations like 3rd and 8, 2nd and 18, 3rd and 12.  In these dire situations Cal needs to pass.  Dunbar is faced with the choice to pass from shotgun or from under center.  The big idea behind a shotgun snap is that the quarterback has more time to read the defense than when dropping back from under center besides the quarterback not have to worry about the dropback.  Given these widely accepted beliefs, the logical choice is to put the quarterback in shotgun.  In fact, the logic is justified in the evidence: out of those 14 must pass situations, Dunbar went to shotgun all but once, and called 11 shotgun passing plays (that’s 11 shotgun passes out of 13 shotgun must pass situations). 

So here is where we all say "AH HA!".  Because here is when we all realize that Dunbar’s tendency to pass when in shotgun is not a tendency of choice, but of necessity.   

Just think, if we weren’t forced into so many passing situations, we wouldn’t have had to pass from shotgun so much, and our run/pass ratio from shotgun would have been something more acceptable such as a 35/65 or a 40/60 run/pass ratio.  Instantly our offense is more balanced, the Tennessee defense is kept off balance, any given play has a greater chance at succeeding, greater odds in our favor mean more yards, more yards mean more points, and more points mean a greater chance of winning. 

So now the question is: why was Cal forced into so many passing situations? 

Well, unless you have completely erased the Tennessee game from your memory you might recall Cal’s WRs dropping passes.  You might remember the Tennessee defense stuffing Cal’s future starting RB Justin Forsett for a 0.2 yard rush average.  You might remember how 9 out of 12 of Lynch’s runs were below his final season average.   You might remember 3 false starts by the Cal offensive linemen.  You might remember how Longshore was sacked 3 times for a loss of 20 total yards - and when he wasn’t sacked he was hurried or hit.  Or how only 2 out of the 14 plays from shotgun in must-pass situations actually resulted in a 7+ yard gain or a first down. 

Plain and simple, Cal was out-played. 

Was Cal out-played AND out-coached?  I will tackle that question tomorrow… 

What would Johnny Drama say?

VICTORY!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 

According to the Chron(icle),  the NFL has withdrawn its patent application to trademark "The Big Game."  However, it could re-apply in the future.  I am not a patent lawyer (though I do play one on TV), so I am not totally deep in understanding here.  It appears that the NFL could basically re-apply with more specific language that directs its application solely to the use of "The Big Game" in relation to the SuperBowl. 

The NFL legal dude notes that in his statement here:

"McCarthy said the applications were withdrawn because they were written more broadly "than the rights were looking to protect.'’"

See, the NFL had claimed that they didn’t want a sort of ambush marketing.  Instead of businesses saying "Buy our big screen TV for the Superbowl" and having to pay money to the NFL, the business would say "Buy our big screen TV for the upcoming Big Game."  The NFL was trying to squeeze MORE money out of people and trademark that "Big Game" phrase when people used it in the "wink wink nudge nudge" manner surrounding the SuperBowl. 

Looking at the article, this statement is indicative of the above reasoning:

"In addition to the schools, 18 companies had lined up against the NFL’s application, including Wal-Mart, Taco Bell, Pizza Hut, Anheuser-Busch, Kellogg and Dell. Although they are not NFL sponsors, some of them advertise on Super Bowl broadcasts."

Clearly, these companies want to continue advertising without having to pay the NFL any money for saying either "SuperBowl" or "Big Game." They were opposing the NFL’s application just like Cal and Stanford were, albeit for different reasons.  But since the NFL’s application could have conceivably snared the Cal/Stanford stuff in its evil web, the NFL decided to scuttle it….for now. 

Hopefully, this is the last we’ll see out of this, but given the NFL’s incomprelievably (combo of unbelievably and incomprehensibly) rapacious greed, I wouldn’t be shocked if we see it again.

Until then, VICTORY!!!!!!!!! 

Ah yes, what horrible memories this picture brings back.  The national embarrassment.  The chants of "overrated".  The never ending taunts of SEC fans saying west coast football is soft. 

I know the Tennessee game was a long time ago but I thought it would be good to go over what went wrong that game.  Ask any Cal fan and they’ll probably tell you that everything went wrong that game.  We all shamefully laugh and agree because… well, what the hell didn’t go wrong when supposedly you’re a top-10 team and a fringe top-25 team dropkicks you with 35 unanswered points? 

But seriously now, does anybody know what really went wrong that game? 

Some people say it was the fact that Cal started a blue-shirt (the Cal equivalent of a red-shirt) cornerback.  Others say it was Cal’s inexperienced quarterback.  Some say it was the offensive line’s inability to protect the quarterback.  Others say will say the Tennessee defense was just like nothing we’ve ever seen before in terms of athleticism, quickness, and speed.  Or some people might suggest it was the fault of Mike Dunbar’s playcalling. 

All the aforementioned reasons are all somewhat correct.  But I’m still looking for a simpler answer.  Something that is just a little more all-encompassing.  And the more I think about it, the more I think the the faults of Cal’s demise can be divided up into two categories: Outplayed and Outcoached. 

Outplayed are all the instances where any Tennessee player beat a Cal player.  Whether it was a CB shutting down our WRs, or a DLineman blowing through our OL, or any instance of a Tennessee player out-hustling and out-performing our players. 

Outcoached are all the instances where our offensive or defensive playcalling was bad or predictable. 

Now, I’m not going to talk much about defensive coaching because I’m simply not a defensive person - offense is more my specialty.  Even if I could speak about Cal’s defense, critiquing the defensive playcalling is inconclusive since Tennessee supposedly decoded or intercepted Cal’s defensive playcalling.  But I am going to talk about Cal’s offensive playcalling.

After the Tennessee game, it seemed as if some Cal fans were ready to fire Dunbar after just a single game.  Fans were saying that the new hydrid offense sucked.  Or whatever elements that Dunbar was trying to incorporate sucked.  Or he wasn’t calling the right plays for our inexperienced quarterback.  It seems as if most fans were screaming for the return to the pre-Dunbar offense.  But was the playcalling really that bad? 

Was Cal outcoached or outplayed? That’s the question that I set out to answer and the purpose for this very long analysis (so bear with me). 

In my search for answers I rewatched the Cal/Tenn game.  Not only did I watch it, I wrote down what I saw.  Not just general notes, but notes about the offensive playcalling.  I’m talking about personnel packages, shotgun vs. under center, formations, down & distance, run or pass, and what types of runs and passes.  All that nitty gritty. 

My hypothesis (and the the seemingly popular hypothesis of many other Cal fans after the game) was this: Dunbar’s playcalling was at fault for the Tennessee loss.  

Proof of my hypothesis would come from predictable playcalling, any "tells" (signs that Cal might be more inclined to run or pass on a certain play), or simply unvaried playcalling. 

For clarity of data I limited my analysis to only the plays where Longshore was the QB.  This is because the plays where Longshore is the QB represent Dunbar’s original offensive ideology and because by the time that Ayoob was in Cal had deviated from the norm to a pass heavy offense in order to catch up.

So with all this introduction stuff out of the way tomorrow we’ll dig into the data, starting with the basics.